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ATIN America has constantly battled with corruption, especially
corruption in transactions with public officials. But, within the last
two decades, Brazil has taken a firm stance against corruption by
passing new laws aimed at combating corruption in business transac-
tions.' Brazil just passed a monumental anti-corruption law, the Brazilian
Clean Companies Act (BCCA), enacted on August 1, 2013, which now
makes companies and individuals liable for bribing public officials.2 The
law is the first of its kind in Latin America and has been likened to the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the U.K. Bribery Act, although it
actually imposes more severe penalties than either its U.S. or U.K. coun-
terparts.3 The law represents a new anti-corruption precedent in Latin
America that will expectantly change perceptions concerning corruption
in business transactions in Brazil and should severely curtail corruption if
effectively enforced. 4
I. HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL
Brazil has a fast-growing economic market with many incentives for
multinational companies; yet, the perception of corruption within the
Brazilian market has posed a significant obstacle for Brazil's continued
growth.5 On a scale measuring the degree of corruption perceived in the
public sector, Brazil scored 3.7, with zero being very corrupt and ten be-
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ing very clean. 6 Moreover, while Brazil's anti-corruption laws may be
exemplary compared with many developing countries, great concern ex-
ists over Brazil's enforcement of these laws.7
Brazil's most recent corruption case exemplifies Brazil's continuing
struggle to enforce anti-corruption measures and portray Brazil as dedi-
cated to fighting corruption so as to attract investors. Brazil's largest and
most highly publicized corruption trial has recently been reopened; the
Mensalao case deals with public funds that were paid to parties for politi-
cal support, essentially members of coalition parties received monthly
payments in consideration for their support of the minority government
under the former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.8 Twenty-five peo-
ple out of thirty-seven people charged received convictions, including
some key political figures. 9 Most notably, Jose Dirceu, considered a
likely Presidential candidate to replace former President Lula, received
almost eleven years incarceration on counts of conspiracy and bribery.' 0
The convictions of powerful political figures brought hope to many
Brazilians, but this hope was short-lived when the Supreme Court agreed
to reopen the cases of twelve of the convicted defendants." Now Brazil
must wait and see whether the convictions are upheld; if the court over-
turns these convictions it will reflect very negatively on Brazil's new anti-
corruption position and considerably hamper their efforts to reduce per-
ceptions of corruption.
Another corruption scandal involved Munich-based Siemens' alleged
participation in a cartel that fixed prices during the bidding for the sub-
way line in Sao Paulo and Brasilia.' 2 In 2008, a member of parliament
and a former Siemens employee reported that Siemens had fixed prices
with multiple global companies and employed the use of bribes to raise
the price of the contracts.' 3 Siemens actually self-reported their involve-
ment in the alleged cartel to Brazilian officials in exchange for leniency
and protection from any criminal proceedings that may ensue if authori-
ties prove the cartel did in fact exist.' 4 The illegal price-fixing between at
least five international conglomerates increased bids anywhere from ten
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to twenty percent, ultimately landing Siemens the construction contract
for $268 million in the late 1990s.15 The media has reported the use of
bribes in the scheme, but Siemens reports that no such allegations have
been supported thus far in internal investigations.1 6 Regardless, on Octo-
ber 10, 2013, Siemens publicly announced in an investigation hearing that
if authorities prove the existence of a price-fixing cartel for the subway
bidding, Siemens will reimburse Brazilian authorities. 17 Investigations
are still underway in the subway price-fixing scheme; however, these
highly publicized corruption scandals involving the government, politi-
cians, and international corporations explain Brazil's motivation for en-
acting a strict anti-corruption law.
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS PRIOR TO PASSAGE OF
THE BRAZILIAN CLEAN COMPANIES ACT
As previously mentioned, Brazil began efforts to combat corruption
almost two decades ago.' 8 Until recently, corruption was prosecuted
under Brazilian penal codes; accordingly, some of Brazil's first steps to-
wards ending corruption began with a host of changes and additions to
the penal code, "including legislation against bribery-related money laun-
dering, securities fraud, concealment of assets, and economic power
abuse."' 9 Then, in 2000, Brazil adopted the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Offices in International Business Transactions
(Convention on Combating Bribery) and in 2003, Brazil signed the
United Nations Convention against Corruption.2 0 While not actually a
member of the OECD, the OECD requested that Brazil, as a party to the
Convention on Combating Bribery, update its corruption legislation to
impose direct liability on companies for bribery of foreign officials. 2 1 Ap-
parently, from the time Brazil ratified the Convention on Combating
Bribery in 2002 until 2012, Brazilian authorities had initiated only one
case and pursued two investigations concerning international bribery.
2 2
But, since 2008, some progress has occurred as convictions for Brazilian
bribery have increased 30 percent.2 3 The OECD's request for updated
anti-corruption legislation in combination with the public outcry arising
from the Mensalao trial presented the perfect backdrop for Brazil to pass
the landmark anti-corruption law and make a drastic step towards fight-
ing corruption in transactions with public officials.
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III. THE BRAZILIAN CLEAN COMPANIES ACT
The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved the legislation in April,
Brazil's Senate subsequently approved it in July,24 and finally President
Dilma Vana Rousseff signed the legislation, officially enacting the BCCA
in August. 25 It will come into effect on January 28, 2014.26 The BCCA
concentrates on combating fraud and corruption within the bidding and
acquisition process for public contracts; however, the law imposes very
comprehensive liability and covers a wide array of acts of corruption be-
sides acts directly related to public contracts.2 7 The BCCA has received
considerable attention as a forward step for Brazil's fight against corrup-
tion, but it remains to be seen how effectively the BCCA can be imple-
mented and enforced. 28
IV. THE ACT'S KEY PROVISIONS
The BCCA imposes very comprehensive liability, but first and fore-
most, it imposes civil liability on individuals and corporations, whereas
previously only individuals could be liable for their acts.29 Now an entity
may be held civilly and administratively liable for any corrupt act of any
of its agents, including any of its directors, officers, or employees.30
Under the BCCA, civil and administrative liability can arise when a Bra-
zilian company or its agents bribe foreign officials or when any company
or its agents bribe any local Brazilian official. 31 Basically, any entity do-
ing business in Brazil that attempts to bribe either a foreign or Brazilian
official imposes liability on that entity, even if the act occurs outside of
Brazil.32 Furthermore, unlike its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, the BCCA
holds all parent and subsidiaries jointly liable for any public contract
found to be in violation of the Act.33
The BCCA employs broad prohibitions to tackle corruption. Accord-
ingly, it prohibits more than simply bribery, but rather it prohibits con-
duct that gives an unfair advantage or even actions that would in any way
prohibit the natural competitiveness inherent in public bidding.3 4 For ex-
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ample, "acts of offering, promising, sponsoring or otherwise supporting"
bribery or any conduct that would unfairly advantage any third party or
any public official are illegal. 35 This covers direct and indirect benefits
offered to a public official or even offered to a relative of a public offi-
cial.36 Attempting to cover up the interests or beneficiaries of illegal acts
through the use of third parties also constitutes a violation of the
BCCA.37 If an entity finances any act prohibited by the BCCA, then they
too become liable for the acts.38 Furthermore, the BCCA is a strict liabil-
ity statute and therefore no showing of a specific intent is required.39 Lia-
bility arises simply upon a showing that any agent or employee of an
entity engaged in an act prohibited under the statute.40 Basically, prose-
cutors do not need to prove that a high level employee knew of the inci-
dent or even that the entity failed to take reasonable precautions, so long
as they demonstrate that the illegal act occurred.
41
V. PENALTIES AND INCENTIVES
On top of providing very comprehensive civil and administrative liabil-
ity, the BCCA imposes severe penalties for violations. 42 If a company
receives a conviction for bribery under the BCCA, up to 20 percent of
their gross annual revenue from the previous year is susceptible to fines,
with a maximum fine of $26,220,000. 43 During the drafting of the BCCA,
the fines capped off at the value of the contract; however, President
Dilma Rousseff vetoed this provision to allow for the imposition of
greater fines. 44 The BCCA allows for sanctions on top of fines including
blacklisting companies previously convicted for bribery and preventing
them from obtaining government contracts, subsidies, or funding for a
maximum of five years.45 Additional penalties allow for disgorgement of
benefits, suspension, and in extreme cases, even dissolution of the
entity.46
But, while the BCCA does impose strong penalties, it also provides
some incentives. For example, companies that have an effective compli-
ance program in place 47 or entities that self-report any incidents of brib-
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ery may have reduced penalties. 48 If a company self-reports, the BCCA
allows the government to create leniency agreements, which can reduce
fines by a maximum of two-thirds, so long as the companies cooperate in
all of the subsequent investigative and administrative proceedings. 49
General demonstrations that the entity has cooperated in investigations
and has attempted to comply with the new provisions allow the govern-
ment to impose lesser penalties and even to execute non-prosecution
agreements, completely barring the government from bringing SUit. 50
VI. POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS
Thus far, the BCCA has been perceived as on par with some of the
most advanced anti-corruption laws in the world;5 1 however, certain as-
pects of the legislation have been doubted, if not criticized. For example,
many terms within the BCCA have no definition, which will likely result
in confusion for companies trying to comply; hopefully, with time such
confusion should dissipate with actual implementation and enforce-
ment. 52 Also, any branch of the Brazilian government can bring an ac-
tion for a violation and the highest authority within that public body then
presides over the hearing, creating a high risk for inconsistent practices
and potential conflict of interests. 53 Unlike the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act, the BCCA does not cover corruption in private transactions; it only
addresses liability for illegal acts in relation to public official.5 4 Lastly,
although many international organizations and foreign governments have
praised Brazil's new anti-corruption law as a positive step forward, skep-
ticism remains about effective enforcement. 55
VII. CONCLUSION
After struggling with corruption in transactions with public officials
that negatively impacted Brazil's economic opportunities, Brazil has now
enacted a monumental anti-corruption law similar to corruption laws in
the United States and United Kingdom. The BCCA sets an unprece-
dented new standard in anti-corruption legislation in Latin America and
brings Brazil into compliance with international standards. If effectively
enforced, the BCCA's comprehensive personal and corporate liability
and strict penalties should severely curtail future bribery and corruption
in transactions with public officials.
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